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Abstract—The flexibility and mobility of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) have made them increasingly popular in a wide range of 
use cases. To protect these networks, security protocols have been developed to protect routing and application data. However, these 
protocols only protect routes or communication, not both. Both secure routing and communication security protocols must be 
implemented to provide full protection. The use of communication security protocols originally developed for wireline and WiFi networks 
can also place a heavy burden on the limited network resources of a MANET. To address these issues, a novel secure framework
(SUPERMAN) is proposed. The framework is designed to allow existing network and routing protocols to perform their functions, whilst 
providing node authentication, access control, and communication security mechanisms. This paper presents a novel security 
framework for MANETs, SUPERMAN. Simulation results comparing SUPERMAN with IPsec, SAODV, and SOLSR are provided to 
demonstrate the proposed frameworks suitability for wireless communication security.
Index Terms—Access control, authentication, communication system security, mobile ad hoc network
1 INTRODUCTION
MOBILE autonomous networked systems have seenincreased usage by the military and commercial sec-
tors for tasks deemed too monotonous or hazardous for
humans. An example of an autonomous networked system
is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). These can be small-
scale, networked platforms. Quadricopter swarms are
a noteworthy example of such UAVs. Networked UAVs
have particularly demanding communication requirements,
as data exchange is vital for the on-going operation of the
network. UAV swarms require regular network control
communication, resulting in frequent route changes due to
their mobility. This topology generation service is offered
by a variety of Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) routing
protocols [1].
MANETs are dynamic, self-configuring, and infrastruc-
ture-less groups of mobile devices. They are usually created
for a specific purpose. Each device within a MANET is
known as a node and must take the role of a client and a
router. Communication across the network is achieved by
forwarding packets to a destination node; when a direct
source-destination link is unavailable intermediate nodes
are used as routers.
MANET communication is commonly wireless. Wire-
less communication can be trivially intercepted by any
node in range of the transmitter. This can leave MANETs
open to a range of attacks, such as the Sybil attack and
route manipulation attacks that can compromise the
integrity of the network [2].
Eavesdropped communication may equip attackers with
the means to compromise the trustworthiness of a network.
This is achieved by manipulating routing tables, injecting
false route data or modifying routes. Man in the middle
(MitM) attacks can be lauched by manipulating routing
data to pass traffic through malicious nodes [3]. Secure
routing protocols have been proposed to mitigate attacks
against MANETs, but these do not extend protection to
other data.
Autonomous systems require a significant amount of
communication [4]. Problem solving algorithms, such as
Distributed Task Allocation (DTA), are required to solve
task planning problems without human intervention [4].
As a result, these algorithms are vulnerable to packet loss
and false messages; partial data will lead to sub-optimal or
failed task assignments.
This paper proposes a novel security protocol, Security
Using Pre-Existing Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(SUPERMAN). The protocol is designed to address node
authentication, network access control, and secure com-
munication for MANETs using existing routing protocols.
SUPERMAN combines routing and communication secu-
rity at the network layer. This is in contrast to existing
approaches, which provide only routing or communica-
tion security, requiring multiple protocols to protect the
network.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 analyses the problem in the context of previously
published work. Section 3 introduces SUPERMAN, provid-
ing a technical discussion of the protocol. Section 4 outlines
the characteristics chosen for modelling, and the results of
simulating SUPERMAN compared against selected secure
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routing and data security protocols. Section 5 draws conclu-
sions from the research findings.
2 RELATED WORK AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS
2.1 MANET Routing
MANETs rely on intermediate nodes to route messages
between distant nodes. Lacking infrastructure to adminis-
trate the manner in which packets are routed to their desti-
nations, MANET routing protocols instead make use of
routing tables on every node in the network, containing
either full or partial topology information. Reactive proto-
cols, such as Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
[5], plan routes when messages need to be sent, polling
nearby nodes in an attempt to find the shortest route to the
destination node.
Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR) [6] takes a proac-
tive approach, periodically flooding the network to generate
routing table entries that persist until the next update. Both
approaches are motion-tolerant and have been imple-
mented in UAV MANETs [7], [8]. Motion-tolerance and co-
operative communication characteristics make these proto-
cols ideal for use in UAVs.
The basic versions of AODV and OLSR lack security
mechanisms, allowing malicious nodes to interfere with the
network in a variety of ways [9], [10], [11]. The key contrib-
uting factor to this problem is an inability to distinguish
legitimate nodes from malicious nodes.
2.2 Security Threats
The ITU-T Rec., through X.805 [12], defines wireless end-to-
end security in seven classifications, which are called
dimensions. This system of classification allows for clear
and convenient identification of security threats in a net-
works and potential solutions to those problems. The fol-
lowing security dimenstions are identified:
 Access control is required to ensure that malicious
nodes are kept out of the network.
 Authentication confirms the identity of communicat-
ing nodes.
 Non-repudiation prevents nodes from broadcasting
false information about previous transmissions, miti-
gating replay and related attacks.
 Confidentiality prevents unauthorised nodes from
deriving meaning from captured packet payloads.
 Communication security ensures that information only
flows between source and destination without being
diverted or intercepted.
 Integrity checking allows nodes to ensure packets
received are in the same form they were sent, with-
out modification or corruption.
 Availability ensures that network assets are accessi-
ble. Periodic checking of node status or reports from
a node to its neighbours are a common means of
checking the availability of a resource.
 Privacy prevents outside observers from deriving
valuable information through passive observation.
Many MANET routing protocols assume trust between
nodes, which can be a critical weakness in terms of secu-
rity [9], as such an assumption may allow malicious
nodes to interfere with routing mechanisms. Routing
attacks can abuse the route discovery and topology gener-
ation mechanisms of routing protocols. An attacker could,
for example, advertise routes with hop counts higher or
lower than real routes [13]. This could be used to attract
traffic to malicious nodes to the benefit of the attacker.
Malicious activity may result in; the appropriation of
data, sinking of packets and modification of packets. All
such outcomes impair the networks ability to guarantee
safe, private and reliable communication.
Unsecured pro-active routing protocols exhibit vulnera-
bility to packet replay and manipulation attacks [14]. Due to
a lack of source authentication, topology control messages
can be broadcast frequently, which other nodes will treat as
legitimate and use to update global topology information.
Pro-active routing protocols detect neighbours through
HELLO messages, allowing tunnelling attacks if a malicious
intermediate node reports a route between two out of range
nodes [15]. This results in the construction of a false topol-
ogy, causing failure of the network when attempting to use
incorrectly advertised routes.
Packet forwarding attacks may be used for Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS). These attacks do not target the routing protocol,
instead forcing the node in the network to act in a manner
inconsistent with the routes established, generating an
excess of traffic or sinking packets maliciously [16]. X.805
describes five key threats [12]:
 Destruction: Completely removing a packet from the
network and deleting it locally, preventing it from
reaching destination and destroying the packet
 Corruption and modification: Making a packet unread-
able, or changing the content of the packet
 Theft, loss or removal: Stealing packets from the net-
work for further analysis, causing packets to drop or
removing them from the network
 Disclosure: Revealing network information by re-
broadcasting received packets to untrusted nodes
 Interruption of services: Disruption of any service the
network offers, resulting in loss of service or unac-
ceptable completion time.
Yang et al. notes that malicious attacks may easily dis-
rupt MANET operations [9]. An attacker can take advantage
of MANETs that assume, but not enforce, trust between
nodes. Closing the network by forcing legitimate nodes to
authenticate can resolve the assumption of trust, by ensur-
ing that only legitimate nodes can become members of the
network [17]. In a closed network, participation is restricted
to authorised nodes, and communication is encrypted to
prevent third-party comprehension of the contents of net-
work communication. Authentication is required to allow
new nodes to join and be seen as legitimate by existing net-
work members [18].
The amount of time an individual UAV node may
remain operational is limited by its battery life (energy),
which may be shorter than the expected duration of the
network’s deployment [19]. A replacement may be required
if a node runs out of energy. Malicious nodes may masquer-
ade as legitimate nodes, attempting to gain trusted status in
the network by posing as a recently departed or newly
arriving node [10].
Subversion of the replacement procedure may be miti-
gated by requiring the successful authentication of a node
with the network. This approach would authenticate nodes
using cerfitificates provided at initialisation by a trusted
authority. This authority is central to the network security
scheme, but need not be present in the field [18].
2.3 MANET Routing Security
To tackle the problems that assumed legitimacy can cause,
secure MANET routing protocols have been proposed.
Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV) and
Secure Optimised Link State Routing (SOLSR) are secure
implementations of AODV and OLSR respectively. SAODV
secures the routing mechanism by including random num-
bers in Route Request packets (RREQs) [20]. If a routing
packet arrives that re-uses an old packet number, that
packet is invalid. Nodes observed sending re-played pack-
ets may be flagged as malicious. SAODV requires that at
least two Secure RREQs (SRREQs) arrive at the destination
node by different routes with identical random numbers to
identify the source node.
SOLSR aims to allow detection of wormhole attacks dur-
ing its neighbour detection phase [14]. Nodes should be
authenticated prior to establishing neighbour status to pre-
vent malicious nodes from asserting themselves as neigh-
bours. Verification of a source node’s identity must be
performed. Each node is assumed to have an asymetric key
pair, managed by a coalition of nodes using threshold cryp-
tography. A distributed Certificate Authority (CA) system
is required to manage this process if certificates are replaced
in the field.
Each packet sent by SOLSR is digitally signed using a
shared secret. If an incoming packet’s signature is unread-
able, the packet is discarded as being unauthentic. This is a
point-to-point process and does not provide source authen-
tication. To prevent replay attacks, SOLSR uses time-
stamped packets. If a time-stamp is seen twice by a legiti-
mate node, the packet will be discarded [14], [15].
Due to the lower hardware specifications and resource
restrictions on UAV-based MANETs, the use of individual
nodes as authentication servers is not ideal. If a node is com-
promised, it may deny legitimate nodes access to the net-
work. If a compromised node has authentication privileges,
it may authenticate additional malicious nodes and possibly
blacklist legitimate nodes.
Centralised approaches rely on a single node taking con-
trol of key management and trust systems [21]. This puts
additional strain on that node due to repeated call for
authentication from other nodes. It also presents a single
vector of attack against network security mechanisms; if the
central authority is compromised, the entire network may
also be compromised.
The primary objective of SAODV and SOLSR is to prevent
malicious nodes from gaining control of the topology genera-
tion mechanisms of the routing protocol, and to protect
against black hole and wormhole attacks. Routing is secured
andmalicious node detection is employed in both cases.
2.4 Secure Communication
Securing routes is only one aspect of a full security solution.
X.805 highlights many security threats including identity,
data manipulation, corruption and theft [12]. There are
three requirements to securing communication; authentica-
tion, confidentiality and integrity.
X.509 sets the standard for certificate-based approaches
to security [22]. Certificates provide a suite of data that can
be used to represent the identity of a given node, and its
relationship with a trusted authority.
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a secure communi-
cation framework extending confidentiality, integrity
and authentication services. It is comprised of three
key protocols: Authentication Headers (AH), Encapsulat-
ing Security Payloads (ESP) and Security Associations
(SA) [23].
AH provides connectionless integrity and source authen-
tication services. It does not provide route authentication, as
IPsec does not account for the route taken to destination.
ESP provides confidentiality, integrity and authentica-
tion services. ESP does not extend protection to the IP
header of a packet. This is useful if the IP header must be
swapped, for example during multi-hop operations. ESP
encapsulates an AH packet which provides source authenti-
cation, once IP headers have been removed.
SA is a collection of security features used by AH and
ESP. All nodes in the network share an SA to provide a
common basis for encryption, authentication and integ-
rity checking.
Ghosh et al. discuss the modification of a certificate-
based application of IPsec supporting dynamic key-genera-
tion for MANETs [24]. They state that their approach
secures mobility, application and management traffic.
Increased latency and bandwidth use were observed as a
cost to their approach.
MANIPsec provides a model entirely focused on
MANET security using IPsec [25]. They propose a modi-
fied IPsec focused on lightweight security, while retaining
authentication and confidentiality features. Their proposal
seeks to extend security to all control traffic, including
routing traffic. A key observation in their work is that net-
work control traffic, such as routing operations, demand
significant resources when compared with most applica-
tion driven traffic.
The approaches discussed to this point have used certifi-
cates for providing security services. From the certificate,
symmetric keys can be derived for secure communication,
allowing confidentiality, integrity and authentication serv-
ices to be extended to any packets that require it.
The Diffie-Hellman key generation algorithm is an exam-
ple of a means of generating symmetric keys without the
need to explicitly communicate any sensitive key informa-
tion [26]. Nodes exchange locally generated data using glob-
ally known primes and local secret data. The resulting
variable (referred to as a key-share) is then communicated
by both nodes, facilitating the calculation of a symmetric key
that is identical at both ends, without the need to communi-
cate sensitive data at any point. This allows the discreet
and secure establishment of node-to-node confidentiality
between specific node pairs [27].
Key derivation functions (KDF) allow the generation of
multiple keys from a combination of a source key and meta-
data [28]. This is useful when a single shared secret needs to
be used in multiple different contexts.
2.5 Summary
Access control has been identified as a security dimension
that might address the issue of implicit trust within a
MANET. By closing the network to outsiders, the issue of
assumed co-operation is circumvented. Closing the network
requires a means of allowing nodes to join and leave the
closed network.
Authentication provides a means by which a node may
be identified as trustworthy. By using a certificate to con-
firm that they share a trusted authority, two nodes may
authenticate one-another based on their shared Trusted
Authority (TA).
Wormhole and Sybil attacks have been analysed and
addressed by protocols such as SAODV and SOLSR. The
protection that these protocols offer is aimed at the protec-
tion of network routing services. These protocols do not
protect data sent over the secured routes.
IPsec and the proposed MANET modifications (MANI-
Psec) protect data sent over networks. They do not protect
the route, leaving the network vulnerable to attacks on the
topology (e.g., MitM).
SUPERMAN, the protocol proposed in this paper,
addresses the problem of unified MANET communica-
tion security. It implements a Virtual Closed Network
[18] architecture to protect both network and application
data. This is in contrast with the approaches proposed in
previous work, which focus on protecting specific com-
munication-based services.
3 THE SUPERMAN FRAMEWORK
SUPERMAN is a framework that operates at the network
layer (layer 3) of the OSI model. It is designed to provide
a fully secured communication framework for MANETs,
without requiring modification of the routing protocol.
Fig. 1 shows the flow of data from transport, through
the network layer (including SUPERMAN) to the data
link layer. The dashed boxes represent elements of
SUPERMAN that process packets and provide confi-
dentiality and integrity. SUPERMAN also provides node
authentication.
3.1 Terminology
Key terms used when describing SUPERMAN include:
 Trusted Authority
 A static node responsible for node initialisation
and provision of certificates; it is a prerequisite
to SUPERMAN.
 Certificate (CKp)
 Required per node and shared with other nodes
to join the network
 Public Diffie-Hellman Key Share (DKSp)
 A public value communicated between nodes
 Private Diffie-Hellman Key Share (DKSpriv)
 A private value, held by all nodes in the network
and never communicated. Used as the shared
secret for Diffie-Hellman key exchange
 Identifier (I)
 A per node unique identifier, such as an IP
address in an IP-based network
 Encrypted Payload (EP)
 Payload data encrypted using an encryption
scheme such as AEAD
 Tag (T)
 A tag, appended as a footer to all SUPERMAN
packets to provide point-to-point integrity services
 Symmetric key (SK)
 SKe(s, d) is a security key used for encryption of
end-to-end communication between a source
and destination node, derived locally via KDF
from the product of the DKSp and DKSpriv
 SKp(s, d) shared by two nodes; used to authenti-
cate traffic as it moves along the network,
derived locally via KDF from the product of the
DKSp and DKSpriv
 Key Derivation Function (KDF(SK, func))
 A function used to provide multiple different
keys from a common private source
 Symmetric broadcast key (SKb), shared with new-
comer nodes by the node that allows them to join
the network, generated by the first node to initialise
the network. Differentiated into two application
specific keys by a network-wide KDF stored locally
on each node
 Symmetric end-to-end broadcast key (SKbe)
 Symmetric point-to-point broadcast key (Skbp)
3.2 SUPERMAN Framework Overview
Every SUPERMAN packet shares a common SUPERMAN
packet header (SH), shown in Fig. 2. The data contained in
the header can be broken down as follows:
Fig. 1. Diagram illustrating the SUPERMAN confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication services for data packets.
Fig. 2. SUPERMAN packet header (SH) structure.
 Packet Type denotes the function of the packet
 Timestamps provide uniqueness, allowing detection
of replayed packets and providing a basis for non-
repudiation of previously sent packets
 The protocol identifier indicates the layer 4 type of
the encapsulated data. This would be the IP protocol
number in an IP based network.
3.2.1 Key Management
SUPERMAN relies on the dynamic generation of keys to
provide secure communication.
The Diffie-Hellman key-exchange algorithm provides a
means of generating symmetric keys dynamically and is
used to generate the SK keys. SKb keys can simply be gener-
ated by means of random number generation or an equiva-
lent secure key generation service.
3.2.2 Secure Node-to-Node Keys
SKe keys are used to secure end-to-end communication with
other nodes, with one SKe key generated per node, for every
other node also authenticated with the network. SKp keys
are used for point-to-point security and generated in the
same manner as SKe keys.
It is important that SKe and SKp keys are different, as the
network needs to secure both the content of a packet and
the route taken.
A KDF can be used to generate these two keys in con-
junction with the result of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
requiring aDKSp/DKSpriv pair, to minimise the cost of secu-
rity on the network and reduce the key re-use and, in turn
the lifetime of each key.
These keys are generated when nodes receive DKSp’s
from other SUPERMAN nodes.
3.2.3 Secure Point-to-Point Footers
Secure footers are appended to all communication packets
sent between SUPERMAN nodes. SKbp and SKp(x) keys are
used in broadcast and unicast integrity service provision
respectively.
An example tag generation algorithm is the Hashed-
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) which provides
integrity and authenticity services to a packet. A digest of
the packet is generated, encrypted with the appropriate key
(SKbp or SKp(x)), and appended to the packet. This tag is
removed, checked and regenerated at each hop.
3.2.4 Secure Broadcast Keys
At initialisation of the network, the first node to be contacted
about joining the networkwill generate a symmetric network
key (SKb). This key is sent to all nodes that authenticate with
the network. This key provides the basis for all broadcast
communication security in a SUPERMANnetwork.
The SKb is processed by the function KDF(SKb, type) into
two broadcast keys (SKbe and SKbp).
A node will use these keys to encrypt and sign packets
sent to the broadcast address of the network. This key is
used for broadcast and multicast communication, such as
MANET route updates. It is not used for communication
between individual end-points.
Upon deriving a broadcast key that will be tied to the
network, the receiving node will add the resulting keys to
its security table. SKbe keys are used to provide confidential-
ity to end-to-end broadcast communication. SKbp keys are
used to generate tags, generated using an algorithm such as
HMAC, appended as a footer to SUPERMAN protected
packets, providing broadcast packet integrity.
Broadcast keys are generated by the first node to partici-
pate in a network joining process as the authenticator (the
responding partner). They are then shared as the final stage
of all network joining processes that result in a new node
becoming a part of that network.
3.2.5 Storage
SUPERMAN stores keys in each node’s security table. The
security table contains the security credentials of nodes
with which the node has previously directly communicated,
as shown in Table 1. This table has n entries, where n is the
number of nodes that the node in question has directly com-
municated with. Table 1 shows an example of a security
table belonging to node A. It has exchanged credentials
with two other nodes, X and Y.
The shared symmetric broadcast key (SKb) has two
derived forms, the SKbe and SKbp. These are stored in the
local security table as a separate broadcast address, denoted
by I(). These keys are not associated with any one network,
but represent security credentials held by the whole net-
work. A node’s ID would be its address.
3.2.6 SUPERMAN Packet Types
Table 2 shows the packet types used by SUPERMAN,
including their default packet sizes before the addition of
any network layer headers such as IP or data link layer
headers such as 802.11.
3.3 Network Access Control and Node
Authentication
A certificate-based method, such as X.509, is used to control
access to the network [22]. Every legitimate node in the
TABLE 1
SUPERMAN Security Table
Node ID SKe SKp DKSp
I(X) SKe(A,X) SKp(A,X) DKSp(X)
I(Y) SKe(A,Y) SKp(A,Y) DKSp(Y)
I() SKbe SKbp SKb
TABLE 2
The SUPERMAN Packet Sizes
ID Type ID Packet Type Size(Bytes)
01 DReq Discovery Request SHþDKSp(s)
02 CReq Certificate Request SHþDKSp(s)
03 CEx Certificate
Exchange
SHþCKpþT
04 CExB Certificate
Exchange with Broadcast Key
SHþT
05 DSKp Req DSKp Request SHþT
06 DSKp Rep DSKp Reply SHþDKSp(s)þT
07 SKI SK Invalidation SHþIþT
08 BEx Broadcast Key Exchange SHþSKbþT
09 DP Data Packet SHþEPþT
network is provided with a certificate by the associated
Trusted Authority.
This allows nodes from different TAs to communicate
securely within the same network, establishing a hierarchi-
cal structure among TAs. This allows multiple controllers,
each with their own TA, to share MANET resources if they
share a hierarchy.
3.3.1 Certificates
Fig. 3 shows an example of the format for a SUPERMAN
Certificate Exchange packet. This example demonstrates an
implementation using a 1,024-byte certificate and 20-byte tag.
3.3.2 Certificate Exchange
A sequence diagram outlining the certificate exchange pro-
cess is shown in Fig. 4.
0. Each node is provided with a certificate from a TA,
in order for it to join SUPERMAN networks.
1. The joining node (A) seeks to join a network by peri-
odically broadcasting Discovery Request (DReq)
packets containing its DKSp. This continues until it
receives a Certificate Request (CReq) from a network-
able node (B).
2. Having received aDReq from node A, node B sends a
CReq packet containing its DKSp to A. Both nodes
perform Diffie-Hellman using the shared DKSps
they now hold, to generate SKe and SKp keys which
are used to encrypt and provide integrity to the rest
of the access control process
3. Upon receiving a CReq from B:
a. A sends its certificate in a Certificate Exchange
(CEx) packet to B.
b. B checks the integrity and authenticity of the CEx
packet, using the shared SKp.
c. B checks the certificate’s authenticity against the
TA hierarchy of its own certificate and the certifi-
cate contains the DKSp shared previously by A.
If the certificate is deemed authentic A is added
to B’s security table. If the certificate fails this
check, the DKSp, SKe and SKp credentials gener-
ated for node A by B are dropped and B and the
process ends.
4. B responds to A’s CEx with its own Certificate
Exchange with Broadcast Key (CExB). A repeats
steps a to d in 2. The CExB also provides A with the
SKb, from which it derives SKbe and SKbp for broad-
cast communication, using the KDF. B and A both
invalidate any prior security associations they have
with each other when receivingDReq or CReq packets
with new information. This involves purging all pre-
vious information from their local security table
entries for each other.
a. If B has not yet authenticated any other nodes, it
will generate an SKb, prior to sending it to the
joining node (A in this case), otherwise it will
send the current SKb to the joining node
5. If A has a broadcast key, it transmits a Broadcast Key
Exchange (BEx) packet containing the new key,
secured with the original key before committing the
new key to its security table.
6. B broadcasts an SK Invalidation (SKI) packet, inva-
lidating any previous credentials A may have had
with nodes within the network. This prevents the
accumulation of expired security data on nodes that
may be isolated from a previous invalidation event.
After authentication has been completed, both nodes will
possess the following data:
 Each other’s certificate
 The network share (SKb) to allow the derivation of
broadcast keys via the function KDF(SKb, type) to
allow secure broadcast communication
 Each other’s Diffie-Hellman Key Share (DKSp),
resulting in the calculation of SK, which is used in
the function KDF(SK, meta-data) meta-data being a
variable indicating whether the key is required for
encryption or other security operations:
 SKe and SKp for end-to-end and point-to-point
secure communication
Following this method, it is possible for a node to build up a
collection of symmetric keys representing its links with
every other node it has exchanged security details with.
3.3.3 DKSp Referral Mechanism
Fig. 5 shows the four distinct conditions under which DKSp
referral may take place.
All nodes that have authenticated with the network will
have a valid broadcast key, and so can perform routing
operations, even with nodes that they do not share SKs
with. However, situations may arise where nodes that may
Fig. 3. Example of a SUPERMAN certificate exchange packet.
Fig. 4. Sequence diagram to demonstrate the certificate exchange
process.
need to communicate with individual nodes, requiring the
exchange of DKSp data.
The DKSp referral mechanism is presented as a means of
exchanging DKSp’s in an efficient manner. If the nodes
involved are separated by intermediate nodes, the
intermediaries may respond on behalf of the destination
node, if they hold the appropriateDKSp in their security table.
DKSp Request (DKSpReq) packets are used to request a
nodes DKSp. DKSp Response (DKSpRep) packets are used
to respond to DKSpReq packets. These packets contain the
DKSp of the destination node. They may be communicated
by the target destination or an intermediate node in posses-
sion of the sought DKSp. The purpose of this process is to
reduce the overhead incurred when forming secure links
between nodes that are both already within the network.
Both types of packet have a tag generated using the net-
work SKbp key appended as a secure footer to provide
integrity checking services.
In three of the four scenarios shown in Fig. 5, A, B and C
have joined the network by authenticating with D. The
fourth scenario assumes that A has roamed from its initial
position, and does not possess the DKSp of any of the local
nodes. Node A is requesting C’s DKSp. All nodes are
assumed to have authenticated with the network.
C1. A needs to communicate with B and A’s adjacent to
B. A lacks B’s DKSp.
a. A DKSpReq is sent to B by A.
b. B responds with a DSKpRep containing its DKSp.
A adds B’s DKSp to its security table.
C2. A needs to communicate with C and requires an
intermediate node B to relay communication. A and
B do not know C, but know each other.
a. A sends a DSKpReq to C via B.
b. C is not known to B. B forwards the DSKpReq
to C.
c. C replies to Bwith a DSKpRep.
d. B adds C’s DKSp to its security table the forwards
it on to A.
e. A receives B’s forwarded DSKpRep, then adds C’s
security details to its security table.
C3. A needs to communicate with C and requires a
route through D and B to reach C. A knows D but
not B or C.
a. If nodes D or B hold the DKSp for C, they may
respond on C’s behalf and pass C’s details on to
A without ever contacting C. The dotted lines in
Fig. 5 represent optional communication that
will not occur if a previous node holds C’s secu-
rity details.
C4. A needs to communicate with C but does not
know D or B.
a. To send messages securely, A needs to know D
and C. A will send a DSKpReq to D. D and A will
associate with each other as per case 1.
b. When associated with D, A will send a DSKpReq
addressed to C. D will relay the DSKpReq unless
it has C in its security table.
c. If D does not have C in its security table, the pro-
cedure outlined in case 3 will be followed.
The above process reduces network communication by
allowing nodes to respond on behalf of other authenticated
nodes if possible. SUPERMAN provides a closed network
of trusted nodes, allowing the trusted exchange of security
credentials by third parties that are also members of that
closed-network. This is an on-demand process, in which
security credentials are not communicated to nodes which
never need to directly communicate.
3.4 Communication Security
Once a node has joined the network, it may engage in secure
communication with other nodes. Secure communication
under SUPERMAN provides two types of security; end-to-
end and point-to-point.
3.4.1 End-to-end Communication
End-to-end security provides security services between
source and destination nodes by using their shared SKe.
Confidentiality and integrity are provided using an
appropriate cryptographic algorithm, which is used to
generate an encrypted payload (EP). Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) is an example
of such an algorithm [29]. AEAD and related crypto-
graphic algorithms provide confidentiality, authenticity
and integrity services. The end-to-end element of a
SUPERMAN packet is not modified at any point along a
route. Its purpose is to provide confidentiality and source
authentication services.
Fig. 5. Sequence diagram to show DKSp referral in four use cases.
3.4.2 Point-to-point Communication
When protected, data is propagated over multiple hops, it
is authenticated at each hop. This is achieved using a hash-
ing algorithm, such as HMAC. This is applied to the entire
packet to provide point-to-point integrity. A tag is gener-
ated using the shared SKp of the transmitting node and
next hop, which is unique to the direct link in question.
The tag is replaced at each intermediate hop, until the des-
tination node is reached. Thus, the authenticity of a route
is maintained, as each node on the route must prove their
authenticity to the next hop. This tag can also be used for
integrity checking.
Fig. 6. shows the structure of a SUPERMAN packet with
end-to-end and point-to-point security services. The tag is
assumed to be 20 bytes in length, but may be truncated
depending on the scenario. A maximum size payload is
used in this example.
3.4.3 Broadcast
When a node initiates a broadcast, it uses the broadcast
address for the network. Instead of using a SKe or SKp,
which would only function between two nodes, SKbe and
SKbp are used. The packet is secured using the end-to-end
and point-to-point methods previously described.
MANET routing protocols require broadcast capabilities.
Both OLSR and AODV require broadcast communication
for routes discovery. SUPERMAN provides broadcast com-
munication security services to allow it to service the spe-
cific needs of MANET routing protocols.
3.5 Summary
SUPERMAN addresses the eight security dimensions
detailed by X.805 by providing a closed-MANET, with end-
to-end and point-to-point security features. The eight secu-
rity dimensions are addressed as follows:
 Access control is provided by SUPERMAN’s network
joining method
 Authentication is provided by certificates, which
allow the relationship between the node and TA to
be confirmed
 Non-repudiation is provided by timestamps in each
SUPERMAN packet header
 Confidentiality is provided end-to-end by payload
encryption using AEAD
 Communication security is maintained by encrypting
and performing source authentication end-to-end,
and checking authenticity and integrity at each hop
 Integrity checking is provided by using a tag for
packet integrity
 Availability is maintained using each nodes security
table, which stores valid authentication credentials.
This is combined with the DSKpReq/DSKpRep
referral mechanisms to increase availability.
 Privacy is provided by end-to-end encryption, with
keys that are specific to the link between two nodes
or a node and the network.
The next section will present and analyse the results of
modelling performed to determine the characteristics of
SUPERMAN and its cost in terms of bandwidth, service
time and throughput.
4 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
To analyse SUPERMAN, the following key areas were
investigated:
 Comparison of security dimension coverage
 Number of communication events required to secure
communications between all nodes
 Number of bytes required to secure communications
between all nodes
 Overhead of securing communication required for
route generation
 Overhead of securing communication required by
Consensus Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA) and
Cluster Form CBBA (CF-CBBA)
The eight key security dimensions, outlined in X.805 are
evaluated by comparison between SUPERMAN, SAODV,
SOLSR, and IPsec/MANIPsec. These are compared in terms
of the services provided. This is important because it con-
textualizes the comparisons of the respective security and
communication costs.
These costs represent the additional data or packets
(based on the number of communication events) required to
provide the security services, referred to from this point as
the security overhead.
Overheads are calculated for the network layer of the OSI
model. The Datalink and Physical layers of the network
stack are not considered as this paper focuses on the net-
work layer (OSI layer 3) specifically.
4.1 Simulation Parameters
All simulation is performed using MATLAB. Table 3 shows
the parameters for the simulation environment.
It is assumed that all packets arrive intact without bit-
error or loss, and that nodes are stationary during the initi-
alisation and association phases.
Fig. 6. Example of a SUPERMAN packet using AEAD and HMAC.
TABLE 3
MATLAB Simulation Parameters
Number of Nodes: 10-100
Routing Algorithm: Dijkstrka [30]
(shortest path)
Number of Iterations: 100
Simulation Area: 100 m x 100 m
Communication Range: 100 m
Max Hop Count: 5
Random Seed: 11
Pseudo-random Number
Generation Algorithm:
Mersenne Twister [31]
Key Share Size 128 and 256 bytes
Certificate Size 1,013 and 1,275 bytes
4.2 Initialisation cost of SUPERMAN and IPsec
4.2.1 Method
Comparison of the control overhead required by SUPER-
MAN and IPsec to initialise a secure network environ-
ment allows for the identification of the initialisation
costs associated with each approach. These costs may
occur throughout the lifetime of the network, but are
incurred only when nodes join the network. Two metrics
are considered:
 The number of communication events
 The number of bytes transmitted
Both metrics are measured until all nodes in a static set
have joined the network.
4.2.2 Results
Fig. 7 compares the number of communication events
required to secure all end-to-end connections in a MANET,
using SUPERMAN or IPsec. All SUPERMAN nodes have
authenticated with the network at this stage, and all IPsec
nodes have performed IKE.
The number of communication events represents the
total number of messages sent, regardless of packet size.
This metric allows one to compare the verbosity of proto-
cols, and comparisons regarding scalability may be made. It
also provides data regarding the length of routes, as each
relay of a given message will increment the communication
event count.
MANETs of 15 nodes require 1,407 events for SUPER-
MAN and 1,609 for IPsec to form security associations
between all nodes. SUPERMAN requires 87 percent of
the communication events needed by IPsec, showing
immediate gains in security association overhead.
SUPERMAN quickly demonstrates the effectiveness of
its referral mechanism, showing itself to be far more scal-
able than IPsec. A clear trend is shown, in which SUPER-
MANmore slowly increases in security overhead compared
to IPsec. In 100 node simulations, SUPERMAN requires
only 42.1 percent of the communication events needed com-
pared with IPsec. This is the result of SUPERMAN node
being able to authenticate each other, without reference to a
central trusted authority in the field. Pre-initialisation of
nodes by a TA implies trusted status when unable to contact
the TA directly.
Fig. 8 compares the number of bytes required to secure
connections between all nodes in a MANET, using SUPER-
MAN and IPsec.
SUPERMAN consistently outperforms IPsec in terms of
the number of bytes required to secure all nodes in a
MANET. For smaller networks, this difference is less pro-
nounced, but for 100 node MANETs, SUPERMAN requires
20.3 megabytes compared to IPsec’s requirement of 30.5
megabytes, when using 1,024-bit symmetric keys. SUPER-
MAN requires only 60 percent of the data required by IPsec
to achieve the same outcome, secure communications
between all nodes. This trend continues for 2,048-bit keys.
SUPERMAN benefits from the cooperative nature of MAN-
ETs in both experiments, whereas IPsec requires each node
to check in with a coordinator during the authentication
process. By allowing nodes to vouch for other nodes that
they have already formed secure links with, SUPERMAN
reduces the length of routes by not requiring DKSpReq and
DKSpRep packets to propagate the full length of the route
between source and destination.
4.3 Data Communication Cost of SUPERMAN
and IPsec
4.3.1 Method
The MATLAB simulation allows the size of the added com-
munication overhead (number of additional bytes) to be
determined. Two scenarios were simulated supported by
the parameters outlined in previously in Table 3:
 CBBA task allocation involving 18 nodes
 CF-CBBA task allocation involving 6 clusters of 3
nodes (18 nodes in total)
 Both DTA processes have a task list of between 1 and
50 tasks all of which must be assigned
 In both scenarios is it assumed that all nodes may
communicate with each other, over routes that are
no longer than the maximum hop count defined for
the simulation
4.3.2 Results
Fig. 9 compares the security overhead of SUPERMAN and
IPSEC performing CBBA.
The lines in this graph incorporate the noise inherent
in the CBBA algorithm. The combination of network size
Fig. 7. Graph comparing the number of communication events to secure
connections between all nodes under SUPERMAN and IPsec.
Fig. 8. Graph comparing the number of bytes required to secure connec-
tions between all nodes under SUPERMAN and IPsec.
and number of tasks can result in the number of CBBA
runs required to achieve consensus varying greatly. The
value is usually constrained to between 2 and 5 runs of
CBBA to reach a solution, and the irregularities in Fig. 9
are a result of higher or lower numbers of runs being
required by a given node/task combination. It is not
trivial to calculate the number of CBBA rounds, as the
number required depends on the size of the network,
positions of individual nodes rleatives to tasks and the
number of tasks.
The number of bytes required by CBBA is shown to grow
rapidly with the size of the CBBA problem domain (the
number of nodes and tasks involved). As more nodes are
added to the network, the complexity of CBBA communica-
tion increases at a cubic rate. IPsec and SUPERMAN add
additional security data, requiring that all outbound packets
are encapsulated with appropriate headers and tags.
IPsec’s overhead is larger than the size (17.1 KB com-
pared with a payload of 15.9 KB). SUPERMAN requires
only 7.6 KB of additional data, but this is still 47.7 percent
of the size of the payload being protected. This is a result
of having assumed the worst case for tag size (20 bytes).
Both IPsec and SUPERMAN security overheads reduce in
relative size for larger problem domains. For 50 task
problems, SUPERMAN requires 30.6 KB and IPsec
requires 68.5 KB, to protect a payload of 1.5 MB. SUPER-
MAN adds approximately 2 percent more data to provide
security for this size of problem domain, with IPsec add-
ing 4.5 percent. SUPERMAN requires half of the overhead
generated by IPsec to provide the same level of protection
to the task allocation process.
SUPERMAN does not require the two IP headers that
IPsec needs. As SUPERMAN is integrated at the network
layer, it does not re-encapsulate the packet. IPsec encapsu-
lates a payload packet in an IPsec security layer, both of
which must have IP headers. By avoiding this redundancy
and stripping settings data from its header, SUPERMAN
reduces its security overhead by a minimum of 32 bytes
per packet.
(1) provides a mathematical expression for the security
overhead of CBBA, under a given security framework.
x ¼ f cð Þ  n n 1ð Þð Þð Þ  hþ tð Þ
p
(1)
The function of c represents the number of rounds
required by a given consensus based distributed task alloca-
tion algorithm. The number of nodes is represented by n.
The header and tag size (are represented by h and t respec-
tively. It is assumed that the payload of a packet will not
exceed the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of the net-
work interface. Therefore, header and tag size is only
counted once per bundle transmission. Header size includes
the IP header when considering protocols that are not inte-
grated into the network stack (e.g., IPsec).
The probability of a packet being delivered is repre-
sented by the variable p, which is set to the value of 1 for
this investigation, assuming no packet loss in all experi-
ments reported on in this paper. This equation holds true
for any non-clustered method of distributing tasks through-
out a MANET.
Fig. 10 shows the comparison of SUPERMAN and IPSEC
performing CF-CBBA in terms of the number of additional
bytes needed to secure data transfer during the DTAprocess.
IPsec requires 1.8 KB for CF-CBBA communicating a one
task problem, compared with 2 KB of data for CBBA.
SUPERMAN generates an overhead of 900 bytes for one
task CF-CBBA problems. For 50 task problems, SUPER-
MAN generates security overheads 45 percent the size of
IPsec’s, while adding only 1.9 percent more data to the bun-
dle exchange process for 50 task CF-CBBA problems. This is
driven by the smaller packet size of SUPERMAN.
Equation (2) expands on the previously shown (1), to
describe how the security overhead of a given protocol
can be derived for CF-CBBA task allocation.
y ¼
X
1iLx ið Þ
 
þ x pð Þ (2)
The total number of bytes, y, is the product of the sum of
all cluster allocation (represented as instances of x). The var-
iable p of x represents the cluster head allocation of CF-
CBBA, which is performed prior to pushing the resulting
task lists to the cluster level for final allocation among clus-
ter members.
For both CBBA and CF-CBBA, SUPERMAN’s smaller
packet size reduces the security overhead required. It is
notable that security overheads are relatively large for
smaller task allocation problems, with larger problems
becoming more efficient in terms of the data being protected
Fig. 9. Chart to compare the number of additional bytes required for the
security overhead of IPsec and SUPERMAN when performing CBBA.
Fig. 10. Chart to compare the number of additional bytes required for the
security overhead of IPsec and SUPERMANwhen performing CF-CBBA.
relative to the data required to provide that protection. This
may be mitigated by reducing the size of the tag appended
to each packet from 20 bytes to a more manageable size,
such as 4 bytes. For this research, the maximum tag size has
been chosen to reflect a worst-case scenario and maintain
parity with the tag sizes observed for SAODV and SOLSR.
A potential limitation of the lightweight SUPERMAN
header is the lack of configuration data. SUPERMAN is
not multi-mode, supporting only one mode of security. It is
intended as a MANET only security protocol. This means
that it lacks the flexibility of VPN protocols, such as IPsec,
but provides more efficient, targeted security to MANETs.
4.4 Comparison of Security Overhead in Routing
4.4.1 Method
The additional cost of secure routing is analysed to deter-
mine the impact of SUPERMAN on a proactive and reactive
MANET protocol. AODV and OLSR, along with their secure
implementations, are compared against SUPERMAN
secured routing using each protocol. Results have been
obtained using a series of MATLAB simulations under the
following conditions:
 Simulation parameters outlined in Table 3
 SUPERMAN is applied to OLSR and AODV routing
packets
 SOLSR and SAODV are used for comparative
analysis
 It is assumed that any pre-routing authentication or
first contact handshakes have been performed prior
to sending routing packets
The results of these simulations show the number of bytes
transmitted during the routing process. Unsecured routing
protocols have no security overhead, providing a baseline
cost for the routing process. SUPERMAN and secured rout-
ing protocols incur this baseline cost, plsu security over-
head. The outcome of these simulations will focus on the
cost of additional security. Cost of security, in this context,
is measured by subtracting the bytes transferred by the
secure protocol(s) from the baseline values shown.
4.4.2 Results
Due to the nature of the experiments undertaken in this sub-
section, a large difference may be perceived between OLSR
and AODV. This is due to the experiments focusing on a
single instance of routing, in which all nodes in the network
form routes with each other.
A single instance of network-wide routing is more
demanding for AODV thanOLSR (in terms of bytes required
to complete the routing operation), but it must be noted that
routes will be maintained under AODV until they time out.
OLSR, however, will regenerate routes periodically. These
results are therefore representative of the total cost for a net-
work wide instance of routing, not the ongoing costs associ-
atedwith routing on-demand or periodically.
Fig. 11 shows the number of bytes required by AODV,
SAODV and SUPERAODV to generate a fully connected
set of routes for a network comprised of between 10 and
100 nodes.
AODV provides the cheapest routing with no additional
security data or behavioural requirements. In networks of
100 nodes, it requires an average of 73 percent of the bytes
required by SUPERMAN protected AODV (SUPERAODV).
AODV requires 60.2 percent of the communication required
by SAODV.
SUPERAODV does not change the behaviour of AODV,
but encapsulates all packets in a SUPERMAN header and
tag to provide authentication, confidentiality and integrity
to the routing process. SUPERAODV adds a security over-
head of 36.9 percent more bytes to AODV, in networks of
100 nodes.
SOADV requires more complex routing behaviour than
AODV and SUPERAODV, as well as the addition of
header data and a tag to provide security services to the
routing process. SAODV generates a security overhead
of 66.6 percent more bytes, when compared to AODV in
networks of 100 nodes.
Fig. 12 shows the number of bytes required by OLSR,
SOLSR and SUPEROLSR to generate a fully connected set of
routes for a network comprised of between 10 and 100 nodes.
SUPEROLSR, does not change the behaviour of OLSR
but, like SUPEROLSR, it encapsulates routing packets in a
secure header and footer (tag). SUPEROLSR requires an
additional 40.8 percent of OLSR’s byte requirement to pro-
vide security to an instance of routing operation performed
between 100 nodes.
SOLSR requires 62.3 percent more bytes than OLSR to
securely route between 100 nodes. SOLSR requires the
Fig. 11. Chart comparing the number of additional bytes required to
secure routing packets using SUPERAODV, SAODV, and AODV.
Fig. 12. Chart comparing the number of additional bytes required to
secure routing packets using SUPEROLSR, SOLSR, and OLSR.
addition of a tag and timestamp to each routing packet,
incurring a significant overhead. This does, however, pro-
vide critical security services not offered by OLSR, as shown
in Table 4 (OLSR provides none of the listed services).
For both AODV and OLSR, SUPERMAN is shown to gen-
erate lower overheads by preserving the behaviour of the
routing algorithms and providing only the required security
features needed to provide authentication, confidentiality
and integrity services to the routing process. Mode selection
variables and multiple digital signatures are avoided.
To provide integrity and authentication services, SUPER-
MAN only requires aHMAC tag and SUPERMANheader.
The relatively low-cost of SUPERMAN can be ascribed to
its use of a closed-network philosophy. By harnessing the
control that the owner of a MANET has over the nodes, and
the dual end-point/router nature of each node, it is possible
to protect routing and application data using a network-
stack integrated solution.
SAODV and SOLSR assume a potentially hostile network
environment, due to the persistent open-medium problem
they are assumed to have to deal with. By closing the net-
work, SUPERMAN can reduce the cost of security by
enforcing trustworthiness within the network.
4.5 Security Feature Comparison
SUPERMAN offers a full suite of security services, address-
ing all eight of the security dimensions outlined in the ITU
Rec X.805 document. Table 4 compares the security services
of SUPERMAN with SAODV, SOLSR and IPsec. This com-
parison provides context for the costs seen in the previous
results, showing the services provided in return for the addi-
tional communication overheads incurred when using
SUPERMAN, IPsec or secure routing protocols in aMANET.
IPsec extends seven of eight security services. It does not
provide node checking availability services to determine
the status of routes and current online members of a net-
work. IPsec does not generally provide route monitoring
or point-to-point security service, instead being primarily
focused on end-to-end security.
Virtual privateNetwork (VPN) protocols such as IPsec are
designed to be adaptable to a variety of networks. They con-
sider the medium itself to be unreliable, and thus focus on
the protection of data transmitted over the network, rather
than the protection of topology generation and maintenance
traffic. This internet-centric design becomes apparent when
applied to MANETs, where the vulnerability of the routing
protocol can remain a significant threat even when commu-
nication security aspplied to application data is being pro-
vided by a VPNprotocol.
SAODV and SOLSR are designed to secure the routes
between nodes, providing protection for end-to-end and
point-to-point communication for topology regeneration
and route finding only. Data sent along such routes is not
secured. The integrity of the route can be enforced, but con-
fidentiality of data packets sent along the route is not.
SUPERMAN provides all eight security services. It is
integrated at the network layer, providing lightweight secu-
rity by avoiding the re-encapsulation process required by
IPsec. It protects routing packets, as all packets passing
through layer 3 of the network stack are protected. In this
way, SUPERMAN provides protection for all data, safe-
guarding the network and data communicated over it.
In addition to protecting data end-to-end (like IPsec),
protection is extended point-to-point, to ensure that the
route between source and destination can be trusted. This is
achievable due to the small size and direct ownership of
MANETs compared to the scale of the Internet, which IPsec
is designed to operate on.
MANETs could have thousands of nodes, but they will
likely be owned by a single authority. Internet-like networks
lack this concept of sole-ownership, making it difficult to
implement integrated security solutions. This difficulty
when attempting to implement an all-encompassing secu-
rity solution encourages the use of IPsec and other network-
agnostic VPN protocols).
By focusing specifically on securing communication in
the context of MANETs, SUPERMAN avoids some of the
higher costs associated with VPN approaches which target
Internet-like networks. It protects all communication in the
network, including routing traffic, protecting against man-
in-the-middle attacks. It compares favourably with IPsec
and secure routing protocols in terms of security overheads,
due to its integration into layer 3 of the network stack.
5 CONCLUSION
SUPERMAN is a novel security framework that protects the
network and communication in MANETs. The primary
focus is to secure access to a virtual closed network (VCN)
that allows expedient, reliable communication with confi-
dentiality, integrity and authenticity services.
SUPERMAN addresses all eight security dimensions
outlined in X.805. Thus, SUPERMAN can be said to
implement a full suite of security services for autono-
mous MANETs. It fulfils more of the core services out-
lined in X.805 than IPsec, due to being network focused
instead of end-to-end oriented.
IPsec is intended to provide a secure environment
between two end-points regardless of route, and has been
suggested by some researchers to be a viable candidate for
MANET security. However, it does not extend protection to
routing services. Nor does it provide low-cost security,
requiring a lengthy set-up and teardown process, usually on
a session basis.
Simulation has been undertaken and the results are
reported and analysed to determine the relative cost of
TABLE 4
Security Feature Comparison
Dimensions Security Protocol
SUPERMAN SOLSR SAODV IPsec/MANIPsec
Access
Control
X X
Authentication X X
Non-repudiation X X
Confidentiality X X
Communication
Security
X X X X
Data Integrity X X X X
Availability X X X
Privacy X X
security for SUPERMAN, compared against IPsec, SAODV
and SOLSR where relevant.
SUPERMAN provides a VCN, in which the foundation-
block of security is provided by authenticating nodes with
the network. This enables further benefits, such as the secu-
rity association referral and network merging. It also pro-
vides a relatively light-weight encapsulation packet and
variable length tag.
Under both CBBA and CF-CBBA, the security overheads
of SUPERMAN have been demonstrated to be lower than
those of IPsec. Both DTA algorithms represent how a
MANET can be made autonomous, by allowing problem
solving without human intervention to occur on the net-
work. Securing the communication required to facilitate this
functionality is a critical consideration when providing a
fully secured network. By providing lower cost security
than existing alternatives, while providing security across
all eight security dimensions, SUPERMAN proves it is a via-
ble and competitive approach to securing the communica-
tion required by autonomous MANETs.
SUPERMAN has been shown to provide lower-cost secu-
rity than SAODV and SOLSR for their respective routing
protocols. By establishing a secure, closed network; one can
assume a certain level of trust within that network. This
reduces the need for costly secure routing behaviours
designed to mitigate the effects of an untrusted environment
(and untrusted nodes) on the routing process. By preventing
the entry of potentially untrustworthy nodes to the network,
and thus the routing process, a MANET may be protected
from subversion of its routing services at a lower cost, as
malicious nodes are barred from the process entirely.
SUPERMAN provides security to all data communicated
over a MANET. It specifically targets the attributes of
MANETs, it is not suitable for use in other types of network
at this time. It sacrifices adaptability to a range of networks,
to ensure that MANET communication is protected
completely and efficiently. A single efficient method protects
routing and application data, ensuring that theMANET pro-
vides reliable, confidential and trustworthy communication
to all legitimate nodes.
Future work includes the implementation of SUPER-
MAN [32] on a simple mobile node platform to allow exper-
imental observation and profiling of its performance, the
proposal of network bridging solutions capable of provid-
ing SUPERMAN services between two closed networks
over an insecure intermediate network, and investigating
the effects of variable network topology on SUPERMAN to
better understand the role of the credential referral mecha-
nism on overhead mitigation in SUPERMAN networks.
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